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ABSTRACT 
This thesis evaluates efforts by neoconservatives during the George W. Bush 
administration to reorient and perpetuate their foreign policy principles away from 
the status quo realist stance dominant during the Cold War.  It will examine the 
main principles of neoconservatives, namely the promotion of democracy through 
the exertion of American power, and demonstrate how these principles have 
changed America’s foreign policy. This thesis argues that neoconservatives have 
advocated a forward leaning foreign policy stance by drawing on themes linked 
to American exceptionalism and democracy promotion. Neoconservatives further 
perpetuate their arguments by connecting their message to American nationalism 
and through access to media outlets to voice their positions on issues.  Overall, 
many of the neoconservative policies enacted in the first term of the Bush 
Administration continue, albeit through different means in the Obama 
Administration.    
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I. ESTABLISHING THE NEOCONSERVATIVE FOOTPRINT  
A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the legacy of the neoconservative movement in 
foreign policy established during the first administration of President George 
Walker Bush.  It evaluates the success of its bid at reorienting American foreign 
policy in the Middle East away from the status quo of realist principles that 
previously guided foreign policy in this region for much of the post-World War II 
era.  In order to analyze this issue, the thesis will seek to determine to what 
extent, if any, neoconservative policies have replaced realist policies and how 
effective neoconservatives have been in establishing conditions to perpetuate 
their relevance.  These two variables will be measured through the various policy 
initiatives endorsed by neoconservatives.  The main policy initiatives to be 
evaluated are: (1) The establishment of a more aggressive posture calling for the 
use of force for preemption as well as a more generalized use as a “preventative” 
tool established in the 2002 National Security Strategy; (2) The adoption of 
democratization as a focal point of American foreign policy in initiating regime 
change; (3) American unilateralism and disdain for the international order in 
executing these objectives; and (4) The diplomatic approach addressing the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The analysis of these policy issues will reveal how 
neoconservatives have affected American foreign policy and the extent to which 
neoconservatives are entrenched in the mainstream of foreign policy ideas. 
B. IMPORTANCE  
As the global superpower, the direction and principles defining America’s 
foreign policy dramatically impacts world affairs.  Realist policies of containment 
(both during the Cold War and early in the 1990s in Iraq) and détente prevented 
the Cold War between the United States and USSR from escalating into 
interstate war and global conflict. Realist Cold War principles also guided 
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American foreign policy in the Middle East, as this area actively participated in 
the jockeying between Cold War superpowers.  This changed in 2000, when 
neocon advisers to President Bush rejected realist balance of power politics in 
the Middle East, instead arguing for the reorientation of American foreign policy 
in accordance with their own principles.  This process was further galvanized by 
the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon on September 11, 2001 
(9/11), prompting the Bush Administration to initiate the global war on terror and 
eventually invade Iraq.   
The attempted reorientation of foreign policy by neoconservatives from 
realist policies reflects the conflict in principles that drive both ideals.  Neocons 
advocate an internationalist foreign agenda, insisting upon a forward leaning 
posture in world affairs to defend U.S. interests and credibility.  They endorse the 
idea of American exceptionalism and inherent morality, holding that the U.S. 
must be the world’s “benevolent global hegemony.”1  This moral ideal is then 
coupled with the idea that U.S. power must not be restrained by international 
organizations, particularly the United Nations.  In order to maintain its 
dominance, the United States must maintain a strong military capable of 
defending its interests worldwide.  Lastly, neocons hold to the universality of 
human rights and freedom, fleshed out through the process of democratic 
government.2   
Neoconservative foreign policy makers operationalized these five 
principles into new security policies in response to 9/11, and drew upon these 
principles to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Critical to these principles is the 
theory of “bandwagoning,” wherein rogue states witness the posture and 
domination of American military might and forgo any attempts at challenging 
                                            
1 William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign 
Affairs 75, no. 4 (July/August 1996). 19–20. 
2 Justin Vaisse, Why Neoconservatism Still Matters, Policy Paper, Foreign Policy, The 
Brookings Institute (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute, May 2010), 3–6. 
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them.  Instead, these states join the United States and capitulate to the American 
interests, ideally through democratic means.3 
The realist school of foreign policy contrasts these claims.  Realists 
bypass the moral foundation championed by neocons, preferring to treat 
sovereign states in the grand scheme of global anarchy where war is “an ever-
present possibility.”4  Instead of relying on military superiority and national 
dominance central to neoconservative views, realists argue that a balance of 
power must be struck within the international arena to address a nation’s national 
interests.5  These interests will drive a nation’s actions and revolve around the 
maximization of a state’s power.  Instead of assuming previously hostile states 
would capitulate and submit to American dominance, realists hold that states 
would hunker down with renewed fervor and shore up defenses against an 
aggressive superpower in an attempt to balance the scales of power once 
again.6 This theory was dominant in Cold War calculations with the Soviet Union 
and was expressed through policies of containment and détente as means to 
restrict the expansionary power of the Soviet Union in the Third World and 
elsewhere.7   
Liberals differ from both realists and neocons in their use of soft power, 
specifically in the utilization of economics and development toward the pursuit of 
national interests.  They agree with neoconservative support for democratic 
                                            
3 John J Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau and the Iraq War: realism versus 
neoconservatism,” Open Democracy, May 18, 2005, http://www.opendemocracy.org/content/ 
articles/PDF/2522.pdf. (accessed Sept 6, 2010), 2. 
4 Michael C. Williams and Brian C. Schmidt, “The Bush Doctrine and the Iraq War: 
Neoconservatives vs. Realists,” The American University of Paris, Nov 2007, www.aup.edu/pdf/ 
WPSeries/AUP_wp61-WilliamsSchmidt.pdf (accessed Aug 30, 2010), 2–3. 
5 Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, 5th ed. (New York, NY: Alfred A Knopf, 1973), 
4–14. 
6 Mearsheimer, “Hans Morgenthau,” 4 and John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power 
Politics (New York, NY: Norton & Co., 2001), 3. 
7 For more thorough context of these interactions: Raymond L Garthoff, Detente and 
Confrontation (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994) 
 4
governments and the importance of morality in evaluating foreign policy.8  
Liberals and neoconservatives have few other commonalities other than 
democratic implications toward world peace, specifically liberal ideas on the use 
of military power and U.S. involvement in the international arena.  Liberals see 
the United Nations as a means of advancing U.S. interests, and are particularly 
hesitant in the use of military force, some going so far as general pacifist 
tendencies.   
Some argue that the actions of the Bush Administration flowed from a 
particular and unique set of principles and priorities adopted by the 
Administration from neoconservative influences.  President Bush rejected the 
realist foreign policy championed by his father in favor of idealistic policies such 
as democracy promotion and preemptive defense driven by the threat of 
weapons of mass destruction proliferating into the hands of terrorists.  These 
policies support neoconservative principles and are a major reorientation from 
historically dominant positions of realist foreign policy thinkers.  Instead of looking 
to balance power through strategic bargaining, neocons instead push for state 
transformation from the inside, asserting that democracies are a more adequate 
representation of the people, are generally peaceful, and rarely fight each other.9  
Furthermore, the concept of preemption and preventative war stems from the 
neoconservative propensity for unilateral military action, rejecting the sovereignty 
draining demands of the international system, and again directly in contradiction 
with realist methods of coalition building.   This propensity further reflects the 
neocon emphasis on use of force as a means to effect change over a realist-
based effort to utilize diplomacy.   
The policies of the neoconservatives are blamed by some for an apparent 
decline in U.S. political credibility around the world, suggesting the advancement 
of American imperialism into parts of the world it does not belong, while suffering 
                                            
8 Mearsheimer, Tragedy, 9.  
9 Vaisse, “Why Neoconservatism,” 6. 
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from hubris and “excessive idealism.”10   Others question whether invasion to 
enact regime change in Iraq was necessary, or whether containment and further 
inspections, the policy from 1991 through 2003, would have eventually weakened 
Saddam Hussein and resulted in his overthrow.11  Discerning the extent 
neoconservative ideas play in this degradation of U.S. power and influence is 
important in validating the efficacy of the neocon experience and determining its 
future viability.  
This thesis focuses on the neoconservative influence on events in the 
Middle East for several reasons.  Policy meets real-world crisis most often 
through the international arena of the Middle East.  Laden with vast reserves of 
hydrocarbons, home of three of the world’s major religions, and the continued 
threat of radical Islamic fundamentalism, the Middle East continues to dominate 
the U.S. foreign policy agenda.  The impact of the neoconservative movement in 
American foreign policy profoundly impacts this region, as Iraq has already 
experienced the effects of U.S. attempts at democracy.  The process toward 
Israeli-Palestinian peace, the prosecution of the global war on terror, and the 
efforts of democratization among the authoritarian regimes in the region remain 
as lingering issues for future policy decision makers. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
This thesis presents several problems in determining the extent of foreign 
policy reorientation and perpetuation of the neocon ideal.  In order to successfully 
measure each of these two questions, political rhetoric and opinions must be 
separated from official U.S. policy.  Each of these components is vital in the 
development and execution of foreign policy and is important measures of 
neocon influence.  However, they must be adequately separated in order to  
 
                                            
10 Robert Kagan, “Neocon Nation: Neoconservatism, c. 1776,” World Affairs Journal (Heldref 
Publications), Spring 2008. 
11 Brent Scowcroft, “Don’t Attack Saddam,” Wall Street Journal, Aug 15, 2002: A12. 
Lawrence Freedman, A Choice of Enemies (New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2008), 397–8. 
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distinguish the ideals promulgated by neoconservative thinkers and the effects of 
actual policy, viewed through Presidential speeches, humanitarian aid, scholarly 
writings, and official policy.   
This thesis examines how neoconservatives successfully reoriented and 
operationalized U.S. foreign policy away from realist policies during the first term 
of the Bush Administration.  This reorientation was accomplished both in the 
development of a new direction of American foreign policy at home, as well as 
the execution of this policy in the Middle East.  The response to the 9/11 attacks 
along with the buildup and eventual execution of the Iraq War in 2003 
demonstrate the extent to which American foreign policy no longer pointed down 
a realist path.  Armed with a “coalition of the willing,” in essence a unilateral 
approach to Iraq (especially compared to the 1991 Gulf War), a dominant 
military, and championing the need for preemptive invasion to thwart Saddam 
Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threat, American efforts in Iraq 
directly corresponds to neoconservative principles.12  
Additionally, this thesis argues that neoconservatives have perpetuated 
themselves amidst the changing climate of American politics.  While several of 
their principles have stalled or fallen into neglect, much of neoconservative’s 
central ideology remains powerful and applicable to world affairs and attempts at 
American leadership.  The realities of a global economic downturn, combined 
with expensive wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have necessitated a change of path 
by the Obama administration to a more realist oriented direction.  This change of 
direction and method reflect more the perceived limits of American power and 
influence than an intentional abandonment of the ideals of the neoconservatives. 
The establishment and sustainment of the neoconservative legacy in the 
Middle East has several dimensions foremost of which is the continued fight for 
democratic ideals in a land traditionally dominated by authoritarian rulers.  
                                            
12 George W. Bush, President Bush Delivers Graduation Speech at West Point, June 1, 
2002, www.teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?documentprint=916 (accessed Dec 5, 
2010). 
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Neoconservative policies of active democratization within Iraq, Lebanon, and 
Palestine have borne unexpected fruits, often not wholly in support of U.S. 
national interests.13  Substantial political rhetoric has been developed regarding 
the advancement of democracy in the region, although until Spring of 2011, 
authoritarian regimes continue to dominate the region and remain close allies, 
regardless of the desire for popular representation.14  The balance between 
perceived security threats and the continued desire to promote democracy within 
the region has restricted the breadth of the Bush Administration’s 
democratization effort in the Middle East. This reality demonstrates how the 
political rhetoric favors neocon ideals of democracy promotion, while the reality in 
the Middle East continues to reflect the realist balance of power.  With the 
waning of neoconservative influence in the second term of the Bush 
Administration, Secretary of State Rice pushed for further efforts to democratize 
within the Muslim world with decreasing effectiveness, although the argument 
remains that with democratic government in regimes such as Egypt, Saudi 
Arabia, and others, Islamist parties could gain power and shed any ties to 
American influence.15  Additionally, American ineptitude in the execution of the 
Iraq War continues to haunt reform and democratization efforts in the region.16   
The spring of 2011 has added a layer of intrigue regarding the 
neoconservative calling for democratization of the Middle East.  Regime 
overthrow in Tunisia, Egypt, rising tensions in Libya and Bahrain, combined with 
the unknown effects of demonstrations in other major Middle Eastern states such 
                                            
13  Jeremy Sharp, U.S. Democracy Promotion Policy in the Middle East: The Islamist 
Dilemma, Congressional Research Service (Washington, DC: CRS Web, 2006). 
14 Richard Falk, “The global setting: US foreign policy and the future of the Middle East,” in 
The Iraq War and Democratic Politics, (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 23. 
15 Nathan J. Brown, Amr Hamzawy, Karim Sadjadpour, and Paul Salem Marina Ottaway, 
The New Middle East (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), 1–
2, 37. 
16 Falk, “The global setting,” 31–33; George W. Bush, Remarks by President George W. 
Bush at the 20th Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, Nov 6, 2003, 
http://www.ned.org/george-w-bush/remarks-by-president-bush-at-20th-anniversary (accessed 
Aug 20, 2010). 
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as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran have called into question what was increasing 
being viewed as a failed mission to transform the Middle East into a land fertile 
for democracy by neoconservatives.  These changes remain in their infancy, but 
they have the potential to reinforce the neoconservative dream of a democratic, 
U.S.-friendly Middle East or prove its fallacy.  These developments, along with 
the rise of Islamic groups integrating into the political process, particularly Hamas 
in the Gaza Strip, have drawn questions of whether or not democracy promotion 
is in the national interests.17   
Additionally, the neoconservative experience perpetuated their existence 
by exposing to the public eye the morality of relying on authoritarian leaders in 
the region and the broader complexities inherent to a “long war” against terrorism 
and radical Islamic fundamentalism.  Furthermore, the complications of the Iraq 
war continue to create waves within the public consciousness, specifically 
regarding the conduct of the military at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  
These actions directly challenge the neocon notion of American exceptionalism, 
displaying a rather unexceptional behavior from America’s finest and stirring 
questions regarding the principles behind the Iraq invasion.   
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Many voices have weighed in on whether neoconservatives have reoriented 
foreign policy and whether they have been able to perpetuate themselves.  Some 
argue that with the backlash from the failed occupation following Iraq War of 2003, 
neoconservatives are in full retreat, while others, including neoconservatives 
                                            
17 Alan Johnson, “The Neoconservative Persuasion and Foreign Policy: An Interview with 
Joshua Muravchik,” in Global Politics After 9/11: The Democratic Interviews, 273–274 
(London, 2008). 
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themselves, insist their message continues to apply to today’s political environment 
and the challenges facing the Obama Administration.18   
Neoconservatives argue that despite the significant price from the 2003 
Iraq War, neoconservative principles have indeed made substantial inroads 
against the balance of power oriented realist policies.  Prominent neocon writer 
Robert Kagan, in an article written prior to the 2008 Presidential election, argues 
that the policies during the Bush Administration reflected the priorities of both 
Democratic and Republican parties.  He states that the language used during the 
2008 Presidential debates directly reflects the principles of the neoconservatives.  
These include principles of American primacy, a strong military, and to quote 
then Senator Barack Obama, the fact that American must be the “leader of the 
free world” in battling evil and promoting good.19  This morally polarized rhetoric 
intimately reflects the core principles advocated by neocons.  
Robert Kagan also demonstrates how neocons perpetuate themselves, by 
connecting their principles to the United States’ founding fathers.  Kagan 
attempts to portray neocon principles as mainstream and wholly American by 
drawing a line in principle from Alexander Hamilton to Theodore Roosevelt to 
Woodrow Wilson until today.  He asserts that neocon actions fall in line with the 
actions of other great Americans and reflect an attitude of ambition, honor, the 
self-defense of national interests and principles, the accumulation and use of 
power, and belief in the possibility of change.20  He admits that while these 
characteristics are often uncomfortable, they are wholly American, as are the 
                                            
18 Those arguing for the decline of neoconservative ideology include:  Francis Fukuyama, 
After Neoconservatism, Feb 19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/magazine/neo.html 
(accessed July 15, 2010); G. John Ikenberry, “The End of the Neoconservative Movement,” 
Survival (International Institute for Strategic Studies) 46, no. 1 (Spring 2004);  Stefan Halper and 
Jonathan Clarke, America Alone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Those arguing 
for its continued relevance:  Justin Vaisse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement, 
trans. Arthur Goldhammer (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
2010); Jesus Velasco, Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy under Ronald Reagan and 
George W. Bush (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2010);  Jacob Heilbrunn, 
They Knew They Were Right (New York, NY: Random House, 2008).. 
19 Kagan, “Neocon Nation.”  
20 Ibid. 
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neoconservatives.  This line of thinking promotes future neoconservative debate 
and discourages opponents from questioning neoconservative values. 
Realists also have expressed their take on the future of the 
neoconservative ideal.  One example is an article by prominent realist writer G. 
John Ikenberry, wherein he describes the misguided policy of hyper-moral, 
unilateral-oriented neoconservatives as rapidly damaging the country’s “prestige, 
credibility, security partnerships, and goodwill of other countries.21  He goes on to 
claim that the neocon agenda was a mistake that will ultimately force U.S. foreign 
policy back into its multilateral orientation due to the tremendous expense of 
occupying Iraq.  Furthermore, he states that the neocon belief of American 
exceptionalism and the hope of bandwagoning nations eager to adopt 
democracy both are flawed beliefs.  In fact, the neocons have squandered 
American legitimacy and moral authority by attempting to act unilaterally and 
bully other states through fear and intimidation.22   
Other voices outside of the neoconservative and realist camps assert a 
more moderate perspective.  Michael Williams and Brian Schmidt, of the 
American University of Paris, claim that while neocons have been the scapegoat 
due to the Iraq occupation, their ability to “frame policy questions within the 
broader discourse of ‘culture wars’ of American politics” have greatly enhanced 
their permanency in the foreign policy debate.23   
Justin Vaisse of the Brookings Institution makes a strong argument for 
why the neocons have perpetuated themselves.  He states that neoconservatives 
perpetuate their existence through influential thinkers at work in major 
publications, the general support of the Republican Party, as well as joining 
forces with liberals to further human rights issues.24  These avenues of exposure  
 
                                            
21 Ikenberry, “The End of the Neoconservative Movement,” 7. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Williams and Schmidt, “The Bush Doctrine.” 
24 Vaisse, Why Neoconservatism, 7–10. 
 11
ensure that neocons remain in the public eye.  In addition, the neocon view of 
idealistic, moralistic, patriotic message has an appeal to young thinkers growing 
up with the Iraq and Afghani wars.25    
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
The method for this thesis will be a case study that examines two distinct 
time periods.  The first period will examine the establishment of the neocon 
influence and its initial efforts at perpetuation through the first term of the Bush 
Administration.  The second period will then evaluate the permanency of the 
neocons through the second term of the Bush Administration and the first two 
years of the Obama Administration.  In order to evaluate these periods, this 
paper will utilize documents covering the full spectrum of foreign policy debate, 
including those of both realist and neocons.  Additionally, official government 
documents will be used to define official U.S. foreign policy in the Middle East.  
Sources will include various think tanks, academic journals and other scholarly 
books, opinion pieces and reports from well-respected newspapers, and 
conference proceedings.   
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be organized as follows:  Chapter I has introduced the core 
beliefs of neoconservatives and how they differ from realist and liberal views.  
Additionally, Chapter I presented the question of whether neocons have 
reoriented policy from realist principles and do they perpetuate their existence.  
Chapter II describes the means of determining if the neocons were able to 
establish themselves and why these means were selected.  Chapter III then 
discusses neoconservatives’ importance during the Bush Administration and the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003.  Chapter IV will discuss how these measures have been 
impacted during the second term of the Bush Administration into the Obama 
                                            
25 Vaisse, Why Neoconservatism, 7; Further discussion in Vaisse, Neoconservatism and  
Valesco, Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy;  
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Administration.  Chapter V will evaluate what has happened to the 
neoconservative movement and draw conclusions regarding their foreign policy 
impact and future as reflected in the foreign policy of the Obama Administration. 
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II. ENDS AND MEANS OF NEOCONSERVATISM 
This chapter will examine the neoconservative efforts in opposition to 
realist and liberal policies of U.S. foreign policy since the 1960s, and provide 
historical context necessary for understanding how neoconservatives captured 
the attention of the Bush administration as a salient philosophy for the developing 
crisis of the radical Islamic threat.  It will be accomplished by detailing the call to 
arms against Soviet aggression by neoconservatives during the Cold War, the 
assertion of conservative principles during the Reagan Administration, and the 
latent frustration experienced during both the elder Bush and Clinton 
administrations.  This historical memory provides necessary context for the 
policies and decisions of the later Bush Administration.  Throughout these 
periods, observing the means of achieving neoconservative policies will also be 
discussed. 
A. FOUNDATIONAL EXPERIENCE 
The neoconservative challenge to realist and liberal veins of American 
foreign policy consists of a struggle through various individuals and organizations 
since the late 1960s.26  During this period, the American military and political 
establishment was reeling from the effects of the quagmire in Vietnam.  The 
Democratic Party’s response to Vietnam resulted in the emergence of the New 
Left movement, with its leader and eventual Presidential candidate, Senator 
George McGovern.  McGovern called for an immediate pullout from Vietnam, a 
significant reduction in military spending, accompanied by an isolationist foreign 
policy. He believed America’s foreign policy regarding the Soviet Union was 
“expansionist and immoral.”27  
                                            
26 Justin Vaisse has conducted an exhaustive work on the neoconservative movement and 
divides the various strands of neocons into three generations.  This paper will primarily deal with 
the later two generations, the Scoop Jackson Democrats and the group known simply as 
Neocons.  Vaisse, Neoconservatism. 
27 Velasco, Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy, 42. 
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It is in this context that the first neoconservatives concerned with foreign 
policy emerge as group located at the center of the Democratic Party.  They 
aimed at regaining the heart of the party from the New Left and their reaction to 
Vietnam that excused Soviet expansion and advocated American retreat through 
isolation.28 Their members included democratic intellectuals like Jeane 
Kirkpatrick, Joshua Muravchik, Elliott Abrams, Norman Podhoretz and others.  
Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson led the neoconservatives as a 
steadfast anti-communist who rejected arms limitation talks or any other 
perceived cooperation with the Soviet Union.  Instead, he called for a strong 
military to counter communism and threats to human rights, coupled with 
progressive government for domestic affairs.29  
While McGovern championed the Democratic New Left, the American 
electorate thought otherwise.  In a crushing defeat, Richard Nixon won the 
Presidency and with it, shifted foreign policy toward closure of Vietnam and 
détente with the Soviet Union.  President Richard Nixon entered the White House 
promising to usher into the Cold War an “era of negotiation” where peace might 
be reaffirmed and reestablished through arms reductions and peaceful co-
existence with the Soviet Union.30  This period, referred to as détente, was felt as 
necessary due to an American weariness with the Vietnam War.  This perception 
by the American populace fed a feeling that, in the grand scheme of the Cold 
War, the balance of power between the United States and the Soviet Union had 
shifted to the point that Americans believed that the United States no longer 
enjoyed military superiority and would likely not reacquire that advantage.31  
Nixon recognized what he believed as American limits and looked to retain the 
considerable advantages that the United States had and use these to his 
advantage to engage with the Soviets. 
                                            
28 Velasco, Neoconservatives in U.S. Foreign Policy, 42. 
29 Vaisse, Why Neoconservatism , 1–2; Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 460. 
30 Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 29–30. 
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Followers of Senator Jackson, known as Scoop Jackson Democrats, took 
issue with détente due to its passive, compliant posture toward the Soviet Union.  
While President Nixon spoke of an “age of negotiation,” neoconservative foreign 
policy experts countered by asserting détente conveyed a message of weakness 
to a Soviet regime that was in its very nature expansionary and threatening.  
They also firmly believed in the defense of the democratic world to stave off 
communist expansion, to include the newly formed state of Israel.  Their cause 
was very much ideological, contrasting the amoral view of the Nixon 
Administration.32   
To combat the détente agenda, neoconservatives helped form the 
Coalition for a Democratic Majority (CDM) in late 1972.  As a generally hawkish 
institution originally intended to recenter the Democratic Party, the CDM became 
one of the first dominant voices challenging Kissinger’s détente.33  Ultimately, the 
CDM advocated an increase in the military budget, including the nuclear arsenal, 
to address the acute threat posed by the Soviet Union’s military expansion and 
the threat to U.S. allies.34  The CDM held the belief that the United States must 
frame the Cold War as an ideological struggle with the Soviet Union and bolster 
its military to defend this belief.35 
This stance isolated neoconservatives from the Democratic Party’s New 
Left, while simultaneously causing conflict with the developing Nixon policy of 
détente with the Soviet Union.  Crucial to the successful execution of détente 
was a centralized decision-making that enabled linkages to be established 
between various initiatives with the Soviets. One episode in particular 
demonstrates the divergence of philosophies between Kissinger and Jackson.  In 
1972, following Soviet-U.S. negotiations regarding increased trade, Senator 
Jackson saw an opportunity to attack détente and expose the weakness of the 
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34 Ibid., 104. 
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Soviet system and its economy.  Jackson introduced an amendment linking U.S.-
Soviet trade of grain and most favored nation status with quotas for the 
emigration of Soviet Jews.  This linkage strained the entire premise of détente.  
By demanding higher than anticipated exit quotas for Soviet Jews, Kissinger lost 
leverage on other issues, while Jackson exposed Soviet unwillingness to address 
human rights.  Ultimately, the trade treaty was dropped by the Soviets who were 
enraged with U.S. meddling in their internal affairs.36   
A second episode that highlights several key strands of neoconservative 
ideology occurs in the 1973 Israeli War.  During this conflict, neoconservatives 
supported the administration’s military aid to Israel, but several conclusions 
emerge that expose some of the roots of neoconservatives.  The 1973 War 
demonstrated cooperation between the Soviet Union and United States, but at 
the expense of Israeli interests, namely the destruction of the Egyptian army.  
Neoconservatives saw this effect of détente as yet another cause for rejecting its 
premise.37  It also demonstrated the intent of the Soviet Union to influence affairs 
in the Middle East, counter to both American and Israeli priorities.  Second, it 
reinforced the reality that Israel remained the lone democracy among 
authoritarian leaders in the region, and as such deserved unmatched support 
from the United States.  The democracy partnership with Israel against 
communism remains a theme through the Cold War and eventually transitions as 
the communist threat fades, but authoritarian leaders hostile to Israel remain in 
power.38 
After a failed run at the Presidency in the 1976 elections, Senator Jackson 
and the neoconservatives experienced a falling out with the Carter 
Administration.  A strained relationship between Jackson and Carter, minimal 
political appointments within the ranks of the neoconservatives into the new 
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administration, and indications of McGovern-aimed foreign policy all reflected a 
discomfort felt by neoconservatives with Carter.  President Carter’s foreign policy 
record did nothing to bridge that gap.  A weakened position on strategic weapons 
(the SALT II treaty talks), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the overthrow 
of the shah of Iran all are widened the gap between neoconservatives (then in 
the Democratic center) and the Carter administration.  President Carter did 
attempt to wean U.S. foreign policy off of détente, abandoning its usage, and 
advancing an agenda challenging the Soviet Union.  Despite this attempt, 
Carter’s execution of his principles, combined with difficulties home and abroad, 
severely limited his successes. Differences between Carter and 
neoconservatives caused neoconservative democrats to question their party and 
drew supporters of Scoop Jackson toward the right.   
A second indicator of the drift between neoconservative democrats and 
the rest of the Democratic Party was the formation of the Committee on the 
Present Danger (CPD) in late 1976.  The CPD was an attempt at expressing 
bipartisan concern regarding the unacknowledged threat of the Soviet Union, as 
exposed in the Team B report.39  The Team B project was a parallel investigation 
initiated by then director of Central Intelligence, George H. W. Bush, to examine 
the capabilities and intent of the Soviet Union.  Team B challenged the prevailing 
reports by the CIA by assessing Soviet intentions and motives, claiming the 
Soviets were using the period of détente to enhance their capabilities and 
position in the world.40  Team B accused the CIA of “mirror-imaging,” and failing 
to take into account the Soviet worldview.41  These misconceptions by the CIA 
and exposure of what was viewed as the true intent of Soviet advances spurred 
the formation of the CPD to warn America and create policy to address an 
unacknowledged threat.  The CPD differed from the CDM in that it consisted of a 
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60/40 split between Democrats and Republicans, and included many politicians 
who would gain notoriety in the 1980s, including Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, 
Richard Allen, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and William Casey, among others.42  The CPD 
produced various pamphlets and articles alerting the American public of the 
Soviet threat, the inadequate policies attempted by the Carter Administration, 
and the need for a more robust military to counter this growing threat.43  The 
assessments of the Soviet intentions attempted to alert the public, but also 
worked to create fear through exaggeration of the threat.  This particular method 
of public interaction becomes a recurring theme in the neoconservative 
conversation, especially in the late 1990s and 2000s. 
The events and presidential election of 1980 proved a critical moment for 
neoconservatives.  Unable to agree with the prevailing views of the Democratic 
Party and their candidate, Jimmy Carter, many neoconservatives joined the 
campaign of Ronald Reagan, a fellow member of the CPD, believing that he 
might restore American prominence.  During the Reagan years, 
neoconservatives witnessed a president who shared their convictions regarding a 
strong military and an aggressive foreign policy against the Soviet Union.  
President Reagan shifted the attitude of the U.S.-Soviet relationship from 
détente, perceived by neoconservatives, and Reagan himself, as passive 
acknowledgement of Soviet initiatives, to one exposing the weaknesses of the 
Soviet regime and the strength of the U.S. capitalist system.44  He intentionally 
sought to expand U.S. support for democratic movements within the perceived 
Soviet sphere, increased the military budget (from $227 billion in 1984 to $303 
billion in 1989) and maintained the superiority of U.S. ideals and principles.45  
Reagan’s strength in addressing the Soviet Union lay in his outlook 
regarding the entirety of the Cold War.  His philosophy, drastically different from 
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the age of détente and preservation of the status quo, held to the belief that the 
United States was uninterested in maintaining the status quo through 
containment or détente, but was interested in victory.46 This belief, very much in 
sync with neoconservative attitudes at the time, manifested itself in the labeling 
of the Soviets as an “evil empire,” clearly drawing allusions to the forces of good 
and evil in the Cold War.47  Reagan also thrust democracy promotion into the 
foreign policy debate as a tactic for confronting the Soviets.  Reagan created the 
National Endowment for Democracy, an organization that promotes democracy 
throughout the world both overtly and covertly, authorizing $18 million toward this 
effort.48  Through the Reagan Doctrine, the United States supported guerilla 
movements or initiated regime change in Grenada, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and 
throughout the Third World.  This tactic specifically combated Soviet attempts at 
expanding their influence into the Third World, but failed to specifically address 
the need for democracy that would define the Bush Doctrine 20 years later.  
During the Bush Administration, with neoconservative backing, the promotion of 
democracy became a means of creating stability, both on a political level and in 
the internal, domestic actions of a nation. 
Initially, Reagan enjoyed support from neoconservatives who approved of 
his perspective regarding the Soviets, however in the latter years of his 
presidency, the moderation of his advisors after the Iran-Contra affair, his 
growing relationship with Soviet Premier Gorbachev, and the movement toward 
peace initiated between them disturbed neoconservatives, who advocated a 
more aggressive, militaristic method of regime change.49 Regardless of their later 
opposition, neoconservatives continue to hold onto the tradition of Ronald 
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Reagan as a courageous stand against communism, paralleled during the 
younger Bush Administration’s struggle with terrorism.50   
The fall of the Soviet Union, from 1989–1991, proved instrumental for a 
new group of neoconservatives.  The third generation of neoconservatives, as 
defined by Vaisse, experienced the transition from Cold War life as the role of 
America changed dramatically.  With the fall of the Soviet Union, America no 
longer faced a superpower adversary, and many declared the United States now 
lived in a unipolar world.51  Neoconservatives experienced the validation and 
subsequent disappointment (to some) of their dominant military posture in the 
1991 Gulf War, and then during the Clinton Administration, bemoaned the 
relaxation and complacency within U.S. foreign policy, declaring that unless the 
United States adopted an aggressive, proactive posture regarding the continued 
threats to its national interests, the nation would lose this moment and succumb 
to another power.52  This assessment of foreign policy ran counter to the 
prevailing post-Cold War conception of a peace dividend, where the United 
States would be able to cash in on excessive military spending previously 
required to buffer against Soviet aggression, diminished attention to world 
affairs.53   
During the Clinton Administration, foreign policy experienced a diminished 
priority for an administration keen on expanding the effects of globalization and 
cashing in on the perceived “peace dividend.”  The Clinton Administration 
rejected the status quo, balance of power perspectives of the Bush 
administration, embracing a more liberal, humanitarian mission for U.S. foreign 
policy.  This liberal bent expressed itself through engagement with the United 
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Nations over Kosovo, and other interventions that neoconservatives and others 
opposed to Clinton, claim either are not sufficient, or do not engage U.S. 
interests.54  Furthermore, neocons cite America’s failed handling of terrorist 
attacks within the United States and abroad coupled with a soft tolerance of 
hostile regimes instead of initiating their overthrow as a failure to advance 
America’s national interests.55 
Both within the Clinton administration and the Republican opposition, the 
late 1990s saw a fight for continued American engagement in world affairs, as 
different parts of both parties “turned away from the world’s problems or 
decline[d] responsibility.”56  Both liberals and neoconservatives (and many 
conservatives) agreed on the role of America as the lone superpower.  With great 
power comes great responsibility, however. 
To this end, neoconservatives championed the cause of “preserving and 
reinforcing America’s benevolent global hegemony” through a robust military, the 
“spread of American principles of governance to include democracy, free 
markets, and respect of liberty” in order to enhance U.S. security interests, along 
with a general distain for international organizations that conflict with the exercise 
of American hegemony.57  The Prospect for the New American Century (PNAC) 
was created as an organization to support these views.  PNAC lobbied both 
President Clinton and congress, expressing their views regarding the 
sustainment of American hegemony, the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, and a 
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harder stance in Kosovo.58  PNAC’s statement of principles through an 
acknowledged acceptance of America’s role in the world as the primary shaper of 
the international environment, increase the defense budget to meet these 
responsibilities, and promote democracy abroad to encourage political and 
economic freedom.59 
Countering the neoconservative cry for military strength, liberals during the 
Clinton years saw the expansion of economic globalization policies and the 
humanitarian missions in Kosovo and Somalia, while maintaining a continued 
emphasis on the promotion of democracy.60 In Iraq, the realist themed policy of 
containment continued in an attempt to restrain further aggression from Saddam 
Hussein.  In the Persian Gulf and Levant, tacit support of regional allies 
continued in order to maintain both economic and political stability. 
B. THE EXPRESSION OF AMERICAN POWER 
The neoconservative transformative vision of American foreign policy 
since the time of the Cold War through the events of 9/11 had several 
overarching goals.  Overall, neoconservatives desired to transform U.S. foreign 
policy back into a forward leaning, aggressive stance necessary for positive 
engagement and protection of American foreign interests throughout the world.  
The threat against America dramatically changed during this period, shifting from 
the Soviet Union, to failed states to include Iraq, to terrorism and WMD, but the 
neoconservative stance remained true it its defense of American interests.  They 
believe that American power and leadership finds its roots in a strong, superior 
military capable of defending U.S. interests abroad.  The dominative presence of 
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the United States also reduces the role and importance of international bodies 
such as the United Nations.  These institutions fail to enforce their actions without 
substantial backing from major world powers, which the United States, as the 
preeminent power, refuses to cater to unless in our interests.  Neoconservatives 
also believe that U.S. interests and intent regarding world affairs reflects 
universal values, such as freedom, liberty, and ultimately democracy for all 
people.  This altruistic approach to American foreign policy is not new, however, 
the context in which it was operationalized and the threat it was challenging 
remains unique.   
1. Context for a Strong Military 
The neoconservative means to change U.S. foreign policy holds as its 
main pillar a dominant, technologically advanced military.  This idea has become 
ingrained in neoconservative thinking as a reaction to the defeatism incurred by 
the struggle in Vietnam, and takes on a larger scale after the fall of the Soviet 
Union.  In this post-Cold War era, specifically after the military dominance 
experienced during the Gulf War, neoconservatives attempted to voice concern 
regarding the future course of American foreign policy.  This concern is best 
addressed through two documents that highlight the neoconservative agenda.  
The first document, addressing America’s lost vision for foreign policy, is the 
initial draft of the “Defense Planning Guidance” and its successor written by then 
Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney.   
This document specifically address the U.S. role in the post Soviet world, 
asserting that the United States must prevent the rise of another world hegemon 
of equivalent power of the former Soviet Union.  Based on the performance of the 
U.S. military during the Gulf War, the United States should continue to remain the 
dominant military presence worldwide, while maintaining continuous awareness 
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of needless police action that is not within our broad national interests.61  
Furthermore, the United States needs to maintain the ability to act alone if 
necessary to combat threats around the world and maintain a military that acts as 
a deterrent against another nation’s attempted military buildup.62   
While the Defense Planning Guidance attempted to provide strategic 
vision for the United States after the Gulf War and fall of the Soviet Union, 
another call went out to conservatives from neoconservatives Robert Kagan and 
William Kristol through their article “Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy.”  
This article attempts to explain the cause for conservative loss of direction as 
well as the positive means for the restoration of American power.  They insist on 
the preservation of America as a “benevolent global hegemony” and, to this end, 
American foreign policy must preserve this status through military supremacy 
and moral confidence.63  Their case for military supremacy is based on the need 
for the United States, as the global hegemon, to have the most technologically 
advanced, global military available to defend against “a breakdown of peace and 
international order.”64  This message was advanced in the midst of an aging 
military whose demands for modernization continue to outpace its budget.  Moral 
confidence was necessary in order to continue to synchronize America’s moral 
calling and its national interests.  They recall the active promotion of American 
principles of liberal democracy coupled with pressure on authoritarian regimes 
such as China, Iran, and North Korea.65 Through their writings, they hoped to 
spur the conservative roots of the Republican party through inspiration, which  
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was not enough of a motivation to obtain the executive branch in 1996.  After the 
9/11 attacks, this motivation shifted to one of fear, a more persuasive argument 
for action.66 
Neoconservatives have established a vision for American foreign policy 
that rebuffs the realist tradition and provides specificity for the often “global 
police” role the liberal tradition implies for American presence worldwide.  
Through a dominant military and a moral compass aimed at the spread of liberal 
values worldwide, neoconservatives look to extend the preeminence of America’s 
“global hegemony” into the distant future.   
C. COUNTERARGUMENTS 
Some argue that the neoconservative vision of “global hegemony” is 
merely an underhanded way of promoting American Empire, or Pax Americana.  
Gary Dorrien argues that American ascendency into world dominance was 
inevitable, but the management of this newfound position has been 
fundamentally mishandled by neoconservatives.  He argues the neocon 
principles encourage “global warfare and cultural engineering” (democracy 
promotion toward an American centered values set).67  Additionally, authors like 
Chalmers Johnson point to the expansive 737 bases maintained by the U.S. 
military and intervention in Iraq among other issues, as proof of imperial 
overreach.68  He connects the U.S. bases in Saudi Arabia as one of the initial 
complaints of Osama bin Laden, implying that U.S. imperialistic tendencies have 
wrought this upon itself.69  Michael Hunt provides additional insight into this 
phenomenon of American benevolence in reshaping areas of the world.  He 
argues that American conduct exposes American foreign policy as “hypocritical 
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and aggressive rather than enlightened and peace-loving.”70  This perception is 
one of the chief issues against the ideology of the neoconservatives and their 
foreign policy. 
D. THE CHALLENGE OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 
The events of 9/11 gave face to these threats warned by Neo-Reaganites.  
Preoccupied with the rise of China and Russia as potential threats, the sudden 
exposure of the Al Qaeda network through the destruction of the World Trade 
Center towers focused the neoconservative agenda and gave it new purpose.  
The events of 9/11 and its aftershock demonstrated with unparalleled clarity the 
insufficiency of realist principles of containment and complacent intervention in 
dealing with global terrorist networks.71  As President Bush then reaffirmed in the 
2002 National Security Strategy, terrorists could not be deterred, and the 
potential of their acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) pose a new 
and severe threat.72  This view of the twofold threat to America’s security, 
terrorism and the potential of WMD in terrorist hands, gave rise to several new 
components of neoconservative doctrine.  Preemption as a means of 
preventative attack was adopted as an assertive upgrade from what was seen as 
passive Clintonian cruise missile strikes that did little to destroy or deter an 
enemy now believed capable of potentially accessing WMD.  The threat of 
another 9/11 changed U.S. decision makers, specifically President Bush, in that 
the United States was unwilling to risk ignoring the internal affairs of states when 
threatened with potential nuclear terrorism, dismissing a foundational assumption 
of realist views.  Along with a growing interest in the internal happenings of 
states, neoconservatives acknowledged the moral contradiction within U.S. policy 
in supporting authoritarian regimes.  The repressive tendencies of non-
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democratic regimes to maintain power erode the moral legitimacy of U.S. policy 
and must resort to instigating regime change.  Initially, this theory specifically 
applied to Communist China, North Korea, Iraq, and other hostile nations.  This 
assertion by neoconservatives loses its appeal when addressing the regional 
leaders of the Middle East.  This phenomenon will be discussed in greater detail 
regarding Iraq in Chapter III.  Notwithstanding the Middle East, neocon 
democracy promotion demanded the assumption that democracies are inherently 
peaceful compared to other regimes thereby enhancing U.S. security interests in 
the region.73 
The attacks on 9/11 provided the opportunity to exercise the aggressive 
position of hard-line neoconservatives.  Bolstered by united public support and a 
president looking for clear answers, neoconservatives provided clear 
assessments and solutions to the new threats to the United States.74 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has illustrated the neoconservative experience and aims for 
reorienting American foreign policy.  In the broadest terms, neoconservatives 
support a forward leaning posture, actively involved in world affairs in order to 
shape conditions favorable for U.S. interests.  Neoconservatives label this pursuit 
“global hegemony,” while other hard-line neoconservatives and critics call it Pax 
Americana, implying there are broader imperial aims involved.  Regardless of 
these differences, it is clear that neoconservatives are not satisfied with policies 
that in the short term or long term, threaten U.S. interests or reputation or merely 
defend the status quo.  Realist concepts of containment and détente do not 
adequately protect U.S. interests; rather, they threaten to undermine them by 
ignoring potential threats. Neoconservatives demand American foreign policy 
lead, promoting intentionally or not the perception of American empire. 
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III. NEOCONSERVATIVES AND IRAQ 
The neoconservative reorientation of American foreign policy in the Middle 
East away from realist principles revolves around the events of 9/11 and 
culminates in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.  This chapter will analyze the change 
within the Bush Administration due to 9/11 that led to the adoption of the 
neoconservative leaning Bush Doctrine.  The invasion of Iraq will then be 
analyzed to show how neoconservative principles became operationalized as an 
active reorientation of America’s foreign policy.  
A. BEFORE AND AFTER 9/11 
The execution of foreign policy relies heavily on the input and worldview of 
the President of the United States.  Each president shapes his administration 
around his priorities and beliefs, creating his own specific doctrine to govern 
foreign interactions.  The development of President Bush’s worldview during 
September 11, 2001, demonstrate the enormous impact the terrorist attacks had 
on revealing and motivating President Bush’s stance as well as the change in his 
perspective on foreign policy.  Who he listened to during this crucial time and 
what advisors proposed combined with his general stance on the role of 
American in the international system are important factors when considering the 
impact of the neoconservatives. 
President George W. Bush assumed the presidency having campaigned 
for the return of humility to American foreign policy.  He supported his father’s 
decision to end the Gulf War at the 100th hour in support of the United Nations’ 
resolution, preventing the overthrow of Saddam Hussein.75  It was assumed by 
many that he would follow the footsteps of his realist-oriented father and continue 
the tradition of containment and sanctions in Iraq that the Clinton Administration 
had been ineffective in enforcing consistently.76  Initially, these assumptions 
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proved true: President Bush did not radically change the priorities regarding Iraq, 
although he began to assert a more focused national interest in American foreign 
policy by withdrawing U.S. support for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and 
the Kyoto Protocol.  Prior to 9/11, President Bush’s priorities coincided with 
nationalist tendencies, where he was more concerned with the U.S. interests 
than in crusading any moral causes or expanding an imperial empire, as some 
might claim.  Stanley Renshon describes the basis of President Bush’s worldview 
as one of a nationalistic realist prior to 9/11, and nationaliststic with 
neoconservative tendencies after 9/11.77  Clearly, the events of 9/11 weighed 
heavily on the President and revealed the weakness of realists’ arguments on 
facing the new threat while displaying the strength of neoconservative 
arguments.  
The events of 9/11 substantially changed President Bush’s perspective 
regarding the role and use of American power in conducting foreign policy.  The 
president quickly recognized the new threat to America and began to calculate 
the risks necessary to face this threat.  The first step was acknowledging that 
America had been attacked and was subsequently at war.  In attempting to frame 
the bounds of this new war, the president began to describe the attackers, 
terrorists of the al Qaeda network, as a radical version of Islam and eventually 
proclaimed America’s war with both terrorists and those states that harbor 
terrorists.78 This decision spawned what is now known as the Global War on 
Terror (GWOT). 
Resolute on defeating this new threat, the president adhered to a specific 
perspective regarding both the Middle East and the source of the terrorist threat.  
He advanced the liberal peace theory, asserting that the authoritarian regimes of 
the Middle East, who advanced a culture of repression and hatred of their 
people, were ultimately the source of the radical Islamic threat.  To this end, he 
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declared the United States would advance the universal values of freedom and 
liberty throughout the region with the hopes of transformation.  With this 
democratic transformation, the United States would then inherit new allies with 
common governmental systems, common values, and common strategic 
priorities, whose people prospered and rejected the radical beliefs of Islamic 
terrorists.79  
This mission started with the immediate prosecution of the Taliban 
government in Afghanistan, accused of harboring the Al Qaeda network.  A U.S. 
military invasion quickly followed, and the attempt at transforming Afghanistan 
from a decentralized tribal system to a centralized liberal democracy continues to 
this day.  After the initial success of subduing the Taliban, the administration 
began to develop the next phase of the GWOT, Iraq.   
B. A RELUCTANT ALLY, CONTAINMENT, AND WAR 
The U.S.-Iraqi relationship commenced in earnest during the Iran-Iraq 
War.  Prior to this conflict, the United States policy in the region considered Iran, 
Saudi Arabia, and Israel as the three pillars supporting U.S. stability efforts in the 
Middle East.  With the fall of the shah of Iran in 1979, and the subsequent 
invasion of Iran by Iraqi forces in 1981, the United States witnessed battle 
between rivals but remained neutral, primarily concerned with sustained oil 
exports from the Persian Gulf.  When the Iran-Iraq War turned to the high seas, 
in what is known as the Tanker War, the United States intervened on behalf of 
Kuwait, reflagging Kuwaiti oilers carrying Iraqi oil with U.S. flags and escorting 
them out of the Gulf to preserve their valuable cargo.  The cessation of hostilities 
between Iran and Iraq in August of 1988 led the United States to remain un-
involved in internal affairs, only concerned with the stability and economic 
prosperity of the region.  Throughout this period, U.S. goals remained the stable  
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flow of oil out of the Persian Gulf coupled with a general concept of containment 
of Iran’s new theocracy, in addition to any potential communist inroads in the 
region.80 
Saddam Hussein disrupted this equilibrium with the invasion of Kuwait in 
August 1990, and was harshly rebuked by U.S. forces in Operation Desert 
Storm.  During this operation, U.S. forces ejected the Iraqi military from Kuwait, 
but failed to destroy the potent Iraqi Republican Guard, allowing much of the Iraqi 
army to flee intact to central Iraq and later be used to repress popular uprisings 
among Shiite and Kurdish people against the rule of Hussein.  The decision to 
avoid the internal politics of Iraq and failure to fully eliminate Saddam’s military 
backbone reflected the dominant position of the senior Bush Administration, 
based on realist balance of power positions, but left something to be desired by 
neoconservatives like Paul Wolfowitz, who saw hope of regime change 
disappear while Saddam’s repression apparatus killed Iraqi citizens.81  Brent 
Scowcroft, the National Security Advisor during the first Gulf War, defended the 
administrations decision to withdraw, stating the he was constrained by the 
balance of power in the region, and did not want to threaten the United States’ 
buffer (Iraq) to an increasingly hostile Iran.82 
The next 12 years in U.S.-Iraqi relations center around U.S. policy to 
contain the threat of an unstable regime in Iraq while preserving oil output from 
the Gulf.  It reflected realist assumptions aimed at maintaining stability and 
producing a generally neutral, responsive approach to any potential aggression 
Saddam Hussein was able to muster.  On multiple occasions through this period, 
United Nations inspectors, in Iraq to ensure the elimination of weapons of mass 
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destruction, specifically nuclear weapons in accordance with United Nations 
Sanction 687, were detained, ejected, and stalled to prevent effective inspections 
of Iraqi weapons sites.83  This culminated in the permanent removal of weapons 
inspectors in 1998, the official change in position of the United States with the 
passage of the Iraqi Liberation Bill endorsing regime change in Iraq as official 
policy, leading to Operation Desert Fox, which some believe substantially 
crippled Iraqi WMD stores and capabilities.84 Operation Desert Fox effectively 
marked the end of containment, as its goal was not enforcement, but the 
weakening of Saddam’s regime, a first step toward regime change.85 
After completion of Desert Fox, the stopgap policy of the Clinton 
Administration became “containment plus,” which consisted of a low-level war 
against Saddam’s regime, coupled with a half-hearted effort at regime change.  
Neoconservatives viewed this policy as “a policy of not having a policy,” due to 
Saddam remaining in power without the pressure of WMD inspections.86 
1. Neoconservative Perspective on Iraq 
Neoconservatives watched the eroding policy of containment with despair.  
In an open letter to President Clinton in 1998, many neoconservatives expressed 
their frustration with containment policies and insisted upon immediate steps 
toward regime change to stabilize Iraq.87 They hoped that regime change in Iraq 
would produce the first wave of democracy in the region, where repressed Arab 
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people would rise up and claim their role in self-government, as a new, friendly 
ally of the United States.88  Furthermore, the replacement of hostile authoritarian 
regimes with democratic ones provides an alternative in Iraq to the failed policy 
of containment excused during the Clinton years regarding Iraq.  This view was 
reinforced by the President Bush’s perspective after the 9/11 attacks where he 
states that containment has bought the United States stability at the price of 
liberty and freedom.89  The primary reason to remove Saddam was the failure of 
containment as a means of minimizing the risk (specifically WMD) and threat 
(proliferation of WMD) he was to U.S. interests and allies in the region.90  This 
reality could be achieved only through the forced removal of the established 
power structure in Iraq.   
In light of this vision for the region, neoconservatives point to several 
events reinforcing the claim for regime change in Iraq.  First, Iraq stood in open 
defiance of the international order, primarily the United States, but also the 
United Nations and the European Union, who since the 1991 Gulf War 
maintained forces in the Persian Gulf as an active containment of Saddam’s 
expansionary rule.  A record of inconsistent, often openly belligerent hostility 
toward mandated weapons inspectors, coupled with a continued opaqueness 
regarding Iraqi chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons, point toward a more 
interventionist solution.  Second, neoconservatives keenly remember in the wake 
of the Gulf War, the shortsighted decision to allow the Iraqi military use of their 
attack helicopters.  Approved by the U.S. military, these attack craft prosecuted 
the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings, mercilessly killing tens of thousands of innocent 
Iraqis.91  Paul Wolfowitz, in particular, saw this repression as a missed 
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opportunity to initiate regime change if the United States had shown any support 
for the Shiite and Kurdish revolts.92  This act of repression immediately following 
the Gulf War, coupled with Saddam’s use of chemical weapons on his own 
people (the Kurds in the north during the Iran-Iraq War), gave credence to 
initiating regime change.   
The ultimate threat of failed regime change revolved around Iraq’s nuclear 
program and other weapons of mass destruction.  After the Gulf War and through 
substantial international pressure, Hussein admitted to nuclear and chemical 
facilities and was told to participate in the inspection and destruction of these 
facilities, per United Nations Resolution 687.  These inspections proved 
ineffective due to Hussein’s belligerent tactics with inspectors, leading eventually 
to a mass bombing of Iraqi defenses in Operation Desert Fox 1998.  
Neoconservatives point to this untrustworthy adversary and depart from the 
realist position of previous administrations who failed to actively impact internal 
happenings of Iraq.93  Instead, regime change coupled with the opportunity for 
democracy should be the guiding principle for Iraq.  Neoconservatives were quick 
to advance the threat and risk of failing to address the rogue Iraqi regime, and 
coupled with the attacks of 9/11, pressed for regime change as a guaranteed 
means of removing the threat.94  
C. AN UNLIKELY MARRIAGE: NEO-LIBERALS, NEOCONSERVATIVES, 
AND IRAQ 
In making the case for regime change in Iraq, neoconservative hawks 
found themselves alongside some unlikely allies.  Liberal hawks endorsed the 
neoconservative mission of regime change in Iraq, many with the help of 
Kenneth Pollack and his book, A Threatening Storm.  Pollack goes into great 
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detail regarding the plight of the Iraqi people, the waning international support for 
effective containment of Saddam through economic sanctions, and the instability 
of Saddam as a national leader.  He makes similar arguments regarding the 
threat of Iraqi WMD, specifically nuclear weapons, and their potential 
proliferation, based on Saddam’s poor calculus in world affairs (failure in the Iran-
Iraq War, the first Gulf War, and in gaining the support of the Arab world in 
general).  Through the lens of a post-9/11 world, these risks are not acceptable, 
and regime change, sooner or later, must be initiated.95  Pollack’s argument 
helped draw in liberals to the more blunt, radical claims championed by 
neoconservatives including Thomas Friedmann (columnist for the New York 
Times) and the many members of the Democratic Leadership Council.96  
Specifically the neoconservative message that containment was no longer 
enough, became an acknowledged reality in conversations regarding Iraq.  
Through these arguments, liberals joined with neoconservatives and advocated 
regime change. 
D. MAINTAINING THE STATUS QUO: REALIST PERSPECTIVE 
REGARDING INVADING IRAQ 
The realist perspective regarding the threat of Iraq is best embodied in the 
objections and policy recommendations of former National Security Advisor to 
George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft.  In his opinion piece in the Wall Street 
Journal, Scowcroft recalls the atrocities of Saddam Hussein, admitting that 
eventually regime change may be necessary.  However, he warns of the threat of 
instability in the region that would occur with the vacuum of power created by 
Hussein’s absence.  Scowcroft reduces the warning championed by 
neoconservatives regarding the proliferation of nuclear weapons into the hands 
of terrorists, arguing that Saddam, even in his most irrational and unconventional, 
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still seeks to preserve his own survival, and enabling terrorists to detonate a 
nuclear weapon would surely signal his last days due to the world-wide 
retribution he would experience.  Scowcroft recommends no-warning weapons 
inspections as a means of calling out Hussein if he were to not cooperate.97 
In agreement with Scowcroft was Secretary of State Colin Powell, who 
conveyed the consequences of regime change, and held a skeptical view of the 
neoconservative assumption of the democratic wave ready to be unleashed on 
the Middle East with the fall of Saddam’s Iraq.  Instead, he maintained that the 
invasion of Iraq would drain momentum and resources from the GWOT but, more 
importantly, liberating Iraq would lead to occupying and then rebuilding Iraq.  
Support for an endeavor like this should be done on an international basis 
(namely through the UN).98  Powell recognized the threat of Saddam Hussein, 
but also realized the long-term implications for regime change, thus rejecting 
much of the neoconservative argument.  
Overall, military and economic containment advocated by realists failed to 
provide a convincing, positive means of handling the new threat embodied in 
Iraq.  Realists called for handling the threat of a rogue leader, WMD, and terrorist 
cells collaborating to strike the United States from afar through passive means of 
economic sanctions, slow collaboration within the international system, and a firm 
reliance that Saddam acted rationally and would not initiate further conflict.  
Neoconservatives argue, in light of 9/11 and the attacks the United States 
homeland, these means of containment were insufficient to guard against future 
terrorist activity and demanded too much risk against a clear threat. 
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E. NEOCONSERVATIVE ALLIES  
The operationalization of neoconservative principles through the invasion 
of Iraq is due to several factors.  During the post-9/11 Bush Administration, 
neoconservative principles found favor in the eyes of leading officials within the 
administration.  President George W. Bush, Vice President Dick Cheney, and 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld all became allies to various causes 
supported by neoconservatives.  Each of these individuals has vastly different 
approaches to American foreign policy, and it is safe to say that none of them is 
directly in sync with the neoconservative movement.  That does little to dismiss 
the influence and importance of these three decision makers in shaping 
American foreign policy after 9/11, and in helping reorient policy toward 
neoconservative principles. 
1. President George W. Bush 
President Bush aided the reorientation of U.S. foreign policy toward 
neoconservative views primarily in his response to the 9/11 attacks.  
Neoconservative ideas and the Bush Administration converge on several fronts.  
Fundamental to both camps’ outlooks was the perception of threats and risk.  In 
a post-9/11 world, the threat of another 9/11 attack, or worse—the threat of 
proliferation of WMD into terrorist hands—demanded action.99  Preemption, if 
necessary, might be the only means to prevent a massive loss of life within the 
United States, and could be the necessary tool to neutralize a new and 
destructive threat facing the nation. The 9/11 attacks removed the option for U.S. 
to remain complacent and enjoy the buffer provided by its size, influence and 
power.100 
While it is unlikely the president sought out neoconservative thinkers, his 
response to the attacks and the course of action in their wake, points to an 
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agreement in perspective between neoconservatives and the president.  Both 
agreed that decisive action was necessary, in line with neoconservative calls for 
active participation in shaping the international community.  In a post-9/11 world, 
the president recognized the threat facing America, and felt it worth the risk of 
invasion to prevent catastrophic loss of life at home.  
Besides the apparent merits of the neoconservative argument for initiating 
regime change in Iraq, it became increasingly clear that President Bush 
recognized the shortfalls of continued containment and sanctions mindset in the 
wake of the new threat to the United States.  The 2002 Presidential Inauguration 
speech, the president begins the rhetorical discussion regarding the importance 
of freedom and liberty, and the American call to spread them and eliminate 
tyranny.101  In the preparations for the 2002 State of the Union address, 
speechwriter David Frum, himself a neoconservative, surmises that the president 
was unwilling to settle for stability as the main goal of the Middle East.102  He 
goes on further to state that he felt the president no longer wanted the United 
States to be a status quo power in the Middle East, but should look to initiate 
regime change in Iraq.103  Additionally, the 2002 National Security Strategy 
compares the threat of the Cold War, where a hostile Soviet regime could be 
deterred through mutually assured destruction to the terrorist threat, who 
threaten WMD as intimidation factors, show little concern for their people, and 
whose methods show little concern for civilian casualties (martyrdom).104 
These beliefs, coupled with the personality of President Bush, a declared 
“compassionate conservative,” tuned into the moral element of this new struggle  
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and led to decisive action following 9/11, casting the conflict as good versus evil, 
reminiscent of the moral clarity called for by the Neo-Reaganite camp of 
neoconservatives.105   
2. Vice President Dick Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld  
Dick Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld were not new to the problem of Iraq.  
As former Secretary of Defense during the first Gulf War, Cheney was intimately 
familiar with the success and failures of that conflict.  The inability to militarily 
defeat Saddam had a tremendous impact on Cheney, and provided motivation 
during his time as vice president under President George W. Bush.  He defended 
his position in 1991 to stop the war, assuming sufficient momentum had been 
achieved for a military coup to remove Saddam from power, supported by CIA 
estimates.  The failure of this to occur during the following years caused Cheney 
to believe that the Bush and Clinton policies of containment in Iraq was 
“faltering,” sanctions “fraying,” and that “Saddam was a growing menace.”  After 
the proclamation of the GWOT, Cheney sought to finish the job in Iraq and 
instigate regime change.106  With this mindset, Cheney was further enabled by 
his access and trusted status with the president.  This relationship propelled him 
into a pivotal status in shaping the U.S. response to Saddam’s threatening 
regime.   
Donald Rumsfeld advanced a superior military perspective, obvious in his 
treatment of Iraq, where his primary concern was the overthrow of Iraq, with little 
planning regarding what came next.  This fell in line with his vision of 
transforming the military, a vision campaigned by President Bush.107  
Additionally, he expanded the military role in Iraq due to his and Cheney’s 
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suspicion of the intelligence agencies.  Rumsfeld created his own intelligence 
network through the Office of Special Plans, led by neoconservative Douglas 
Feith.  Mimicking the formation of Team B, neoconservatives within the DoD 
were able to analyze their own intelligence and present it to the president through 
the vice president and/or the secretary of defense.  This process, combined with 
what were eventually found to be bogus reports by connections to Ahmed 
Chalabi’s Iraqi National Congress, demonstrated a desire to have intelligence 
match policy instead of policy being guided by intelligence.108 
Both Cheney and Rumsfeld maintained different priorities from 
neoconservatives, but both aligned within the neoconservative camp regarding 
the threat of Iraq and the means of regime change to eliminate the threat.  Their 
vision simplified the post-invasion situation, failing to address the complexity of 
democracy promotion in a nation foreign to these lofty ideals.  To be clear, these 
three powerful individuals in the Bush Administration were not neoconservatives.  
However, their individual perspectives often aligned themselves with 
neoconservative principles, and expressed themselves in policy under the full, 
vocal support of the neoconservative movement. 
The Bush administration diverged from neoconservative ideals on several 
fronts during the prosecution of the GWOT.  In the run-up to the Iraq War, specific 
attention was made to attempt to convince the world through the United Nations, 
that Saddam was building WMD.  Neoconservatives acquiesced to this enterprise 
as long as it did not derail the actual use of force and initiation of regime 
change.109  The most disturbing contradiction between the Bush Administration 
and the principles of the neoconservatives was the Administration’s treatment of 
authoritarian regimes, specifically in the Middle East.   
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During the initial aftermath of 9/11, President Bush made several allusions 
to democratic reform and liberal change in the cadre of regimes in the Middle 
East.110  In reality, the initial months and years of the GWOT saw little to no 
change in conduct.  The United States was unable or unwilling to apply sufficient 
pressure to regimes (Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Saudi Arabia) for a variety of reasons, 
including supposed torture of suspected terrorists, or reliance on foreign oil.   
F. IRAQ AND GWOT? 
While the Bush Administration and its doctrine substantially reinforce 
neoconservative ideals, many argued against the actions taken by the 
administration.  One of the weaknesses of the neoconservative agenda is its 
inability to distinguish within the public debate the differences regarding 
international terrorist organizations.  This also fails in line with the vagueness of 
the GWOT of the Bush Administration. Scholars argue that neoconservatives fail 
to recognize the intricacies of the post-cold war world, specifically the reality that, 
while nations such as China and Russia may eventually pose significant threats 
to U.S. security, the current threat, exposed during the 9/11 attacks, exists on a 
transnational level, and should not be limited to various nations.111  
Neoconservatives insisted upon the danger of a known threat in Saddam’s Iraq 
instead of coming to grips with the new threat, Al Qaeda.112  Additionally, the 
nuance that exists between the countless Islamist groups, their various 
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missed by neoconservatives.  Instead, broad labels have been affixed, which 
expose a lack of insight, and reduce opportunities for moderation among Islamic 
groups.113 
The roots of this argument can be traced back to the Cold War and the 
experience of the neoconservatives in countering realist approaches to Soviet 
aggression.  David Hoogland Noon succinctly points out the many connections 
between the neoconservative writings after 9/11 leading up to the Iraq War of 
2003 and the experience of the neoconservatives during the Cold War.114  He 
states the neoconservatives attempt to draw historical lessons from the Cold War 
that are “reductive and dramatic” and, by doing so, “impose historical clarity 
where others might find ambiguity and contingency.”115  
G. CONCLUSION 
Overall, this chapter demonstrated how the Bush administration 
operationalized the core principles of neoconservatives as a response to the 9/11 
attacks, specifically in the invasion of Iraq.  The advance of their principles was 
embodied in the Bush Doctrine and enjoyed support due to a common cause 
with the White House and neoliberal establishment.  Overall, the initial 
prosecution of the Iraq War demonstrates the culmination of the neoconservative 
vision.  Chapter IV will demonstrate how quickly that vision collapsed, and how 
neoconservatives have responded to its demise. 
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IV. AFTER THE NEOCONSERVATIVE MOMENT 
This chapter examines the changing environment in which 
neoconservatives found themselves during the second term of the Bush 
Administration into the Obama Administration.  This period begins the erosion of 
legitimacy of the neoconservative ideology, as WMD are not found in Iraq, the 
hope of a quick transition to Iraqi democracy fades in the face of an active 
insurgency bordering on civil war, and American casualties mount.  During this 
period, neoconservatives mount an active campaign to justify their existence and 
insert their opinions and perspectives into the national debate regarding 
developing foreign policy challenges.   In addition to the changing political climate 
realized by neoconservatives, this chapter will also examine how 
neoconservatives perpetuate their existence and ideology in American foreign 
policy.  
A. AFTER “MISSION ACCOMPLISHED” (MID–2003 THROUGH 2008) 
While the conventional war against Iraq lasted a mere 21 days, ending 
with the fall of Baghdad on May 1, 2003, the U.S. presence on Iraqi soil was far 
from over.  Neoconservative ideology had insisted, along with the Bush 
Administration, that a Saddam-less Iraq would quickly embrace freedom and 
assume responsibility for governing the country.  The neoconservative vision for 
regime change had been initiated, but the crucial question to be answered was, 
what now?  Neoconservatives like Richard Perle, Douglas Feith, and Paul 
Wolfowitz had become convinced that Ahmed Chalabi, leader of the vocal and 
influential Iraqi National Congress, would be the leader-in-waiting in Iraq.116  
Reality on the ground conveyed a different truth.  Chalabi, as an Iraqi exile, 
proved to wield minimal influence in a country he had fled years previously, 
resulting in minimal popular support in the transition government apart from U.S.-
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appointed positions granted him.117  Chalabi was only part of the disconnect 
between DoD and DoS in executing the transfer of power in Iraq.  In the run-up to 
war, the DoD, particularly Secretary Rumsfeld, assumed primary responsibility 
regarding the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq.  His deputies, 
including Paul Wolfowitz, Douglas Feith, and Richard Pearle, all played major 
roles in developing policy while promoting a divided front within the U.S. 
government for post-invasion planning.118  Skeptical of any DoS inputs, or of 
Army planners, and content to allow former exiles like Chalabi presume to run 
Iraq, DoD leaders failed to provide necessary vision and then lost control of 
Ambassador Bremmer as he disbanded the Iraqi Army and prohibited Baathist 
leaders from assuming positions of power in the new government.119  The 
neoconservatives’ hoped-for and expected swift transfer of government never 
happened.  Not until 2005 were elections held, only after the security situation 
was calm enough to allow for mass elections.  While this came as a surprise to 
some neoconservatives who had touted the examples of Germany and Japan as 
forerunners for change to democracy, scholars and skeptics believed 
otherwise.120  Specifically, the swift, ideological transition described by 
neoconservatives failed to correspond to the realities on the ground.  Even 
before the Iraqi invasion, the GWOT exposed a tension in the Bush 
Administration’s democratic promotion that remains unresolved.  The demands of 
the GWOT and realities of the Iraq War have left the United States unable to 
pressure autocratic regimes like Saudi Arabia and Egypt into democratic reforms.  
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This tension has exposed the hypocrisy of the democracy promotion push in the 
Middle East and weakened the neoconservative argument.121  
Further troubling the neoconservative legacy in Iraq was the insurgency 
that rocked the country, and the descent into a sectarian conflict in 2006.  The 
neoconservative vision of unilateral American power exercised in Iraq faced new 
and daunting challenges in the face of an asymmetric, unconventional 
insurgency.  Initial Army estimates required 200,000–260,000 troops for post-
combat operations, while Rumsfeld and some neoconservatives called for 
75,000, and quickly diminishing that level to 30,000.122  Neoconservatives’ 
expression of American power is through the military, and through the trust of 
military professionals.  This alliance was broken largely due to the stubbornness 
of Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, who dominated major decisions regarding 
Iraq, and on whom neoconservatives eventually turn in the wake of the Abu 
Ghraib scandal.123  Neoconservatives eventually aided the military by urging for 
more troops and helping to develop a new strategy to counter the war-torn 
nation, initiating what became the Iraqi Surge, an insertion of an additional 
20,000 troops used to invigorate a new counterinsurgency strategy.124  
Neoconservatives blame the administration’s failure to usher in a competent 
government after the fall of Saddam mostly on Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
and Paul Bremer, the top civilian in Iraq.  Neoconservatives accuse Rumsfeld of 
shortchanging U.S. forces by demanding reduced troop levels, as well as failing 
to provide a succinct plan to rebuild the country.125   
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The other bombshell to the neoconservative ideology was the reports 
coming from Abu Ghraib prison.  Abu Ghraib had been used as a primary 
detention facility for suspected terrorists and insurgents, but military personnel 
stationed at the prison were incapable of handling the massive managerial and 
security challenge thrust upon them.  Coupled with a top-down demand of 
“actionable intelligence” by the chain of command, an ill-prepared force of 
interrogators in the prison treated prisoners outside the regulations established in 
the Geneva conventions.  For neoconservatives, it exposed the total lack of 
planning involved, as well as betrayed the exceptional nature of American foreign 
policy.126  This treatment also accompanied claims of torture and harsh treatment 
of “terrorists.”  Some neoconservatives defend these claims due to the 
extraordinary nature of the new fight in which the United States found itself.  This 
debate continues, especially regarding the status of prisoners at Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba. Regardless, the moral high ground was lost, along with the 
perception of American benevolence.127 
The effects of the neocon-supported invasion and subsequent occupation 
of Iraq in 2003 had unintended consequences elsewhere in the Middle East.  
Israel, with a history of tense relations with its Arab neighbors, was given free 
license to dominate relations with Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
due to U.S. preoccupation with Iraq and unwillingness to engage with Yasser 
Arafat.128   Instead of becoming tied up with fruitless negotiations with a known 
supporter of terrorism, the United States began to demand for renewed efforts at  
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democratic governance within the Palestinian-occupied territories.129  This 
ultimately resulted in the establishment of Hamas, another blatant supporter of 
terrorism. 
During this period, several strands of neoconservative backing remained 
strong within the U.S. foreign policy.  Rhetoric of democracy promotion in 
particular picked up steam with the formation of the Freedom Agenda.  While 
Secretary Rice called for renewed democratic elections in Palestine, Egypt, and 
other Arab states, actual change was minimal.  U.S. influence in the region, due 
to neoconservative-supported campaigns in Iraq and, to a lesser extent, 
Afghanistan, drained much of the influence and political willpower from further 
efforts of reform.   While President Bush and neoconservatives talked of a “New 
Middle East,” little has changed as neoconservatives expected.  In Gaza, Hamas 
won a democratic election, thrusting the Islamist group into formal government 
authority.  In Egypt, the 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary elections are 
viewed as fraudulent, rigged to maintain Mubarak in power.  Some view the 
administration’s shift into democratization as an excuse for the lack of WMD 
discovered in Iraq, while others point to the reality that going to war often has 
many complex reasons, to which democracy promotion was one of the more 
important ones.130 
Neoconservatives saw support for their vision erode from within as well as 
from outside sources.  Notable neoconservative Francis Fukuyama, whose work 
the End of History and the Last Man was instrumental in forming the Bush 
administration’s perception of a post-Cold War world and its push for democracy, 
rejected what he called the “hard Wilsonian” execution of policy by 
neoconservatives.  He states that those who advocate change through military 
means miss the heart of what neoconservatives stand for, and have created a 
distinct idea that he does not support.131  
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B. THE ROLE OF BARACK OBAMA (2008–2011)  
The election of Barack Obama signaled what was thought to be sweeping 
changes in American foreign policy.  Campaigning as the “anti-Bush” and 
promising to reestablish American leadership in world affairs and usher in a 
period of engagement with hostile states, President Obama entered the White 
House amid tremendous expectations for change.  This change amounted to a 
repudiation of the neoconservative ideology, although the actions of the Obama 
Administration fall short of fully revoking the legacy of the neoconservatives. 
During this period, the perpetuation and continued reorientation of foreign policy 
toward neoconservative principles enters a new stage with different challenges. 
1. The Worldview of Barack Obama 
Several documents point to President Obama’s foreign policy ideology.  
These documents will be examined and compared with the actual status in the 
Middle East, as will funding activity in support of these actions, in an attempt to 
demonstrate how neoconservatives have perpetuated themselves. 
President Obama provided initial insight into his future foreign policy 
initiatives in his article, “Renewing American Leadership.”   As the title of this 
article indicates, President Obama believes American leadership has gone 
astray, due to the Bush Administration’s response to the “unconventional attacks 
of 9/11 with conventional thinking of the past,” resulting a state-centric response 
to an asymmetric threat.  The “war of choice” in Iraq and the resulting actions at 
Abu Ghraib have caused the world to lose trust in American purposes and 
principles.132  His response to this loss of trust is a direct challenge of 
neoconservative principles.  While Obama reaffirms the importance of America’s 
military and reserves the right to act unilaterally when necessary, he insists upon 
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the necessity for American leadership with worldwide partners, instead of the 
harsher stance taken during the Bush Administration.133   
Two other speeches provide hints at the president’s worldview.  Here, the 
president reinforces several themes counter to neoconservative ideals.  He 
specifically calls for multilateral action to address the world’s problems, while 
maintaining the U.S. prerogative to strike unilaterally if necessary.  Throughout 
these speeches, he emphasizes the need for cooperation, adherence to the rule 
of law, and treaties among nations.134  Additionally, the president, in his speech 
to the Muslim world in Cairo, addresses the shortfalls of the Iraq invasion, stating 
the United States would not force nations to adopt democracy, but would partner 
with them.135  All told, there is a clear movement by the president to shift focus 
and priorities from military dominance to one of engagement through soft power 
and diplomacy.   
This movement away is further reflected in the 2010 National Security 
Strategy, wherein President Obama attempts to steer U.S. foreign policy 
execution away from the emphasis on preemption, prevention, and military 
intervention to advance and defend U.S. interests.  Instead, he shifts the 
emphasis from confrontation with Iran and North Korea to soft power, a more 
nuanced view of a complex world where engagement through diplomatic 
discussions can also advance U.S. interests.136  President Obama saw 
opportunity in the gray areas, while the Bush Administration demanded black and 
white distinctions.  Neoconservatives meanwhile, assailed the president for 
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coming down too soft on hostile regimes, compromising American safety against 
future terrorist threats, and blaming America for the shift in world opinion.137 
In spite of the shift of emphasis by President Obama, several themes of 
neoconservatives continue to enjoy popular approval and endorsement by the 
Obama Administration.  The president continues to endorse the concept of 
American leadership and a forward-leaning American foreign policy espoused by 
the neo-Reaganite camp, but proposed the execution of this policy through new 
means.  President Obama’s view of American power still rested in the military, 
but its execution in the international system goes went beyond flexing the U.S. 
military strength.  Additionally, President Obama supports the pursuit of universal 
values such as human rights, freedom and liberty, culminating in democratic 
government.  This stance sounds familiar to neoconservatives, however the 
execution of these principles will not be done through the use of military force.  
Again, Obama backs away from military supported nation-building, instead 
looking to soft power through the DoS to encourage democratic growth.138 
2. The Actions of Barack Obama 
While the worldview of the Obama Administration may have been outlined 
in various speeches and essays, his actions tell a more complete story of the 
Obama Administration’s priorities.  President Obama faced several challenges in 
assuming the Presidency in 2009.  His first moves included an order outlining the 
closure of the Guantanamo Bay terrorist prison and withdraw troops from Iraq by 
December 2011.  These actions are consistent with his worldview and signal a 
retreat from neoconservative ideals.  His handling of Afghanistan, specifically his 
decision to send 17,000 more troops coupled with a withdrawal deadline of 2014 
presents an interesting case regarding the president’s worldview.  Both the Iraq 
and Afghanistan wars were inherited from President Bush, however, Obama 
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campaigned on the “war of choice” in Iraq, which distracted U.S. efforts to 
combat the real threat, Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan.  The president’s 
decision to address the threat, in response to 9/11 and in spite of Iraq, shows a 
willingness to face the nation’s enemies and dismisses calls that Obama 
endorses a liberal humanitarian ideology.  Neoconservatives were quick to 
support the president in his staying the course in both Iraq and Afghanistan, 
although their primary complaint regarding his tenure is the implied decline of 
American power that the president endorses.139  President Obama’s handling of 
the U.S. operations in Afghanistan is one of several issues inherited from the 
Bush Administration where he has maintained course, in this case, unilateral, 
military action in Afghanistan, seemingly contrary to his stated worldview.   
Another carryover from the Bush Administration is the continued focus on 
democracy promotion in the Middle East.  Obama’s support for democracy is 
partially evident in his budgetary support for the National Endowment for 
Democracy (NED) and the Middle East Partnering Initiative (MEPI).  Over the last 
several years, Obama has authorized consistent budgetary increases for NED, 
raising funding from $74 million in 2007 to $118 million in 2010 and 2011.140 This 
funding for democracy projects tells only part of the story considering the Arab 
Spring of 2011. 
a. Egyptian Calculations 
Recent revolts in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya have once again drawn 
neoconservative views into the national discussion regarding the policy options 
for U.S. involvement in the greater Middle East.  Both in Egypt and in Libya, 
questions are being asked regarding the role of the United States, as the self-
proclaimed champion of democracy, standing by and watching the killing of 
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innocent protesters by regime thugs.  In Egypt, this played out in a call by 
neoconservatives for the United States to fully endorse the protestors and 
abandon America’s longtime ally, Hosni Mubarak.141  This claim divided the 
neoconservative camp due to the perceived threat against Israel resulting from a 
democratic Egypt.  Many leading neocons, including Robert Kagan, William 
Kristol, Charles Krauthammer, and Elliott Abrams, supported the Egyptian rebels 
touting the resurgence of the Bush Freedom Agenda. Some neoconservatives, 
such as John Bolton, have expressed their concern over the Israeli-Egyptian 
peace accords and the unknowns democracy will bring to their relationship.142  
The president’s involvement, besides phone communication with President 
Mubarak, is unclear, but the movement of Egypt toward democracy seems to 
have little to do with American efforts, regardless of neoconservative support. 
While democracy promotion clearly remains an important priority 
within the Obama Administration, its execution stands in stark contrast to the 
Bush Administration and some neoconservatives.  Instead of brute force, 
President Obama has been forced to forge ahead on foreign policy issues in 
spite of a weak economy and its lingering effects.  Combined with the baggage 
inherited from the Bush Administration, the president has had less to work with in 
his attempt to restore American leadership.  
C. NEOCONSERVATIVE PERPETUATION 
The neoconservative response to both the retreat of the Bush 
Administration and the swift change by the Obama Administration was thorough.  
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Neoconservatives drew on the formative years of American foreign policy, tracing 
their ideology to the historical examples of Teddy Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, 
and Ronald Reagan, neoconservatives defended their principles, equating them 
to those common among the themes of American foreign policy.143  Part of this 
appeal was a general call of nationalism by neoconservative writers.  The 
ideology of neoconservatives, expressed in their writings as well as in the 
rhetoric and support of President Bush and others in the administration, stoked 
nationalistic fervor.  Ideas of liberty and freedom for all acted to connect the 
neoconservative message with one of American pride and sense of mission.144  
The cost of this association and an activist foreign policy is the deterioration of 
our “capacity for domestic renewal.”145  This tension between an activist foreign 
policy, described as forward leaning or assertive throughout this paper, and the 
price of that policy, economic, political, strategic, and social, are questions 
neoconservatives face to maintain their influence.  Part of this response can be 
seen in the revised vision of the Foreign Policy Initiative (FPI).  This institution, 
founded by leading neoconservatives William Kristol and Robert Kagan, no 
longer aims for hegemony, but seeks to prevent isolationism from encroaching 
on American foreign policy.  Additionally, this group calls for supporting U.S. 
allies, human rights, a strong defense budget, and the encouragement of 
international economic growth.146  These goals seem to reflect the lessons 
learned from the activist policy in Iraq, although intentionally refraining from 
conceding over-reach.147 
Familiar with the changing cycles of power in American politics, 
neoconservatives have realigned in acknowledgement of their loss of standing.  
Their perpetuation and continued influence during the Obama Administration in 
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part relies on the exposure of their ideology within the media.  Through various 
organizations, conservative and within the mainstream, neoconservatives have 
found continuous outlets for their views.  Among the primary sources of the 
neoconservatives’ writings, two institutes continue to support their views: the 
Weekly Standard and the American Enterprise Institute.  The Prospect for a New 
American Century was disbanded due to the association with the Iraq war and 
replaced by Foreign Policy Initiative, as described above. Additionally, several 
neoconservative scholars have positions in the Brookings Institute (Robert 
Kagan) and the Council on Foreign Relations (Elliott Abrams, Max Boot, Kagan), 
as well as proclaiming their views in opinion pieces in the Washington Post, Wall 
Street Journal, LA Times, and routine coverage on Fox News.148 
Along with their establishment in media outlets, Jesus Valesco points out 
that neoconservatives have aligned themselves with certain career politicians, 
such as Joseph Lieberman (I-CT) and John McCain (R-AZ).  Combined with a 
politically attuned awareness of opportunity, neoconservatives will continue to 
push for their ideals and look for the next opportunity to join in directing policy 
from within the government.149 
D.  CONCLUSION 
Overall, the second term of the Bush Administration into the Obama 
Administration have seen the removal of neoconservatives from government 
positions and a heavy critique of the effects of their principles in policy-making 
circles.  The neoconservative goal of democratic change has struggled to come 
to fruition in Iraq or Afghanistan despite elections that indicate a first step 
forward.  Overall, the impact to U.S. foreign policy due to the lack of post-war 
planning by the Bush Administration, the abuses at Abu Ghraib, and the general 
struggle in Iraq has weakened American positions against Iran and North Korea, 
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sent a message of frustration regarding the transition toward liberal democracy in 
the Arab world, and repelled any hope of assistance from other nations.150   
Neoconservatives have responded by continuing to voice their views 
regarding American engagement and remaining vocal in national security debate 
as evidenced by the recent revolts in Egypt and Libya.  Several authors remain 
convinced that, while neoconservatives have fallen out of favor due to Iraq, they 
remain a potent opinion within the foreign policy discussion ready to reengage 
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This thesis has argued that neoconservatives reoriented American foreign 
policy during the first administration of President George W. Bush in response to 
the 9/11 attacks.  Neoconservatives utilized allies within the administration, as 
well as their own proponents, to advance an alternative to realist, status-quo 
foreign policy.  Neoconservatives endorsed regime change in Iraq, established 
through military dominance and expressed in a preemptive, unilateral fashion 
due to the increased threat realized on 9/11.  The history of Saddam Hussein, 
combined with the destruction of WMD, validated neoconservative calls for action 
in a post-9/11 world.  In order to neutralize this newfound threat of terrorism and 
WMD, neoconservatives advocated the promotion of democracy, relying on the 
belief that mature democracies do not fight each other.   
The record of the neoconservative influence on America’s involvement in 
Iraq and the broader Middle East has undoubtedly drawn substantial, deserved 
fire.  Failing to provide necessary detail to the massive operation of creating 
democracy in Iraq constitutes a major, inexcusable failure of neoconservative 
thought.  Neocons maintain that the military failed to send enough troops and 
only too late reacted to the developing insurgencies.  While these claims may be 
true, neoconservatives are responsible for the vision they cast, as a transformed 
Middle East capable of good government and responsible action in the 
international community. 
Overall, this thesis aimed to show how neoconservatives, through the 
endorsement by the Bush Administration, reoriented American foreign policy 
away from realist concepts of containment and détente.  While neoconservatives 
have engaged wider support for both democracy promotion and the broader 
concept of American exceptionalism, their views fail to engage with the Obama 
administration on several other issues.  Due to the crippling effects of the global 
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recession, the United States has seen its unipolar dreams burst along with its 
domestic housing market.  American action and influence continue to dominate 
world opinions, and there is little doubt that the United States remains the 
strongest nation in the world, but the popular debate and concern regarding the 
rise of China and other powers remains stuck in the collective memory.   
Within the Persian Gulf and Levant states, the effects of the Iraqi 
democracy project remain to be seen.  Several clear effects have developed.  
With Saddam deposed, the dominant issue in the region continues to be Iran’s 
largely unchecked pursuit of nuclear weapons and the United States’ response to 
these aims (a topic largely ignored in the run-up to the Iraq war).  Within the 
future policy decisions, the neoconservatives again make their claims for regime 
change and democracy.  The onus of preemption remains within the U.S. policy 
alternatives; however, regarding Iran, this option continues to be politically, 
economically, and militarily unfeasible in the current environment.   
The recent uprisings in Egypt, Tunisia, and Yemen also have engaged 
with neoconservative arguments.  Many are remembering the “Freedom Agenda” 
of the Bush Administration and glorying in the ousting of dictators and 
advancement of democratic governments.  More radical neoconservatives have 
proclaimed the Freedom Doctrine, canonizing the efforts of President Bush.151 
Meanwhile, as the United States continues to recover from a global 
recession and, for the first time, has its top military commanders concerned 
about national debt, maintaining a robust military budget looks unfeasible (and 
has become one of the primary challenges of neoconservatives).  Secretary of 
Defense Gates has taken several steps to internally reduce the military budget, 
but likely faces significant cuts as deficit hawk politicians no longer regard the 
defense budget as untouchable.  While conducting a midterm review of President 
Obama’s foreign policy, James Lindsay pointed out that “[i]t is very hard to 
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sustain a role of global power when you are gushing red ink.”152  The lack of 
fiscal stability has hurt U.S. influence and, ultimately, U.S. power worldwide.  
Neoconservatives continue to rely on America’s military might, for good reason; 
but, the realities of the U.S. debt and its public reaction through the creation and 
elective power of the Tea Party contend with the neoconservative ideal. 
B. PERPETUATION 
In spite of these failures, neoconservatives have provided a vision for 
American foreign policy after the Cold War. Their appeal and ability to connect 
the historical tones of American foreign policy to the complex changing 
environment of today’s world remains their primary effort to the foreign policy 
debate.  They have forced into question the role of American hegemony, proving 
that mere rhetoric and military force alone cannot secure democracy for a nation 
or a region.  Additionally, their theory of cascading regimes toward democracy in 
the Middle East remains elusive and unrealistic for the reasons they supported.   
The neoconservative ideology and its effects fall in a long line of 
ideological crusades within American foreign policy.  Routinely, these efforts 
aimed at expanding liberty and freedom result in “conditions at home inimical to 
that very principle.”153  From World War II interment camps, to the conduct of 
American servicemen at Abu Ghraib, the ideology expressed in American foreign 
policy often conflicts with the reality in American conduct. 
Michael Hunt, writing in 1987 describes many of the lingering effects of the 
neoconservative footprint 20 years later as he observes the effects of ideological  
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foreign policy.  Hunt points out a secondary effect of ideological foreign policy 
periods in the form of the “imperial Presidency.” He describes this phenomenon: 
Through the twentieth century, foreign affairs has strengthened the 
financial resources, expertise, and discretion available to the 
executive branch.  Congress has been overshadowed, the public 
left in the dark, and a culture of national security has flourished.  
These trends have undermined constitutional checks and balances, 
restricted the flow of information, impeded intelligent debate, and 
diminished the electoral accountability of policymakers-all serious 
blows to the workings of a democratic political system.154 
All told, this description fits well into the footprint of the neoconservatives during 
the Bush Administration.  While all of these effects should not be directly 
attributed to their ideology and influence, their ideas greatly contributed to how 
America would respond to 9/11 and the broader post-Cold War world. 
 
                                            
154 Hunt, Ideology, 178. 
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